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I.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case.
This appeal raises questions of law related to the legal standards and application of the

doctrine of successor liability – a limited judicial exception to the general rule that a company
purchasing the assets of another company is not liable for its debts. Appellee Alsco, Inc.
(“Alsco”) obtained a judgment against its former customer, Appellant Fatty’s Bar, LLC (“Fatty’s
LLC”), on the alleged basis that Fatty’s LLC wrongfully discontinued its services in violation of
a contract which Alsco had entered into with a wholly different entity that operated a previous
restaurant/bar at the same location. Even more concerning is that Appellant Fatty’s Inc. was
found not to be liable for an unpaid debt of the prior company– but instead was ordered to pay
liquidated damages because it discontinued the services of Alsco which Alsco claimed to be a
breach of five-year automatic renewal clause in a contract. Thus, Appellant has been found
liable as if it were a signatory on a five-year contract signed by another company before
Appellant was even in existence – and which it undisputedly did not even see until the alleged
breach occurred.
The judgment based on successor liability must be set aside because 1) Alsco did not
state a sufficient claim and present sufficient evidence to meet its burden of proving Fatty’s LLC
was a successor corporation to Alsco under the doctrine of successor liability; 2) the statute of
frauds precludes Alsco from enforcing a five-year auto-renewal and liquidated damages clause
against Fatty’s LLC because it did not sign the contract; and 3) successor liability does not allow
a purchasing company to be held liable in an amount in excess of the amount which the
purchasing company paid for the assets of the predecessor company.
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This case presents legal issues 0f ﬁrst impression in Idaho as they relate to the application

0f the doctrine of successor

liability.

That doctrine was designed t0 be an exception t0 the

general rule that a purchasing corporation

trial

t0

is

not liable for the debts of a selling corporation. The

court greatly expanded the doctrine 0f successor liability

ﬁnd

appeal

Fatty’s

is

LLC

liable for liquidated

based 0n undisputed

liability

its

and the

statute

established use in order

LLC never signed.

in a contract Fatty’s

facts established during the court trial.

Court review the doctrines of successor
undisputed

damages

beyond

This

Appellant requests the

of frauds as they apply to these

facts.

Statement of Facts.

B.

As
before the

Mike

explained in detail in the Course 0f Proceedings section below, this case was tried

trial

Ginnetti,

court Without a jury. Alsco appeared through a local corporate representative,

who

did not

work

for

Alsco

until

2015 and therefore had no personal knowledge

0f the events leading up t0 the alleged breach of contract. Alsco called only four witnesses:

Mike

Ginnetti; Justin

Zora (Via deposition testimony); Defendant Clay Roman; and Steve

Masonheimer, the owner of Appellant Fatty’s LLC. The
1.

facts are, for the

most part, undisputed.

Plaintiff/Respondent Alsco, Inc.

Alsco, Incorporated (“Alsco”)

is

a linen supply

City, Utah, With a local ofﬁce in Boise, Idaho.

Alsco

company that is headquartered in

is

in the business

food and beverage linens. Alsco provides these linen services t0

its

Salt

Lake

0f supplying and servicing

customers on a regular, usually

weekly, basis by supplying linens such as bar towels, napkins and table cloths t0 the business for
use,

and then services the business by picking up, laundering, and delivering the supplies on a

regular (usually weekly) basis. R. p. 2.
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Customers obtain services from Alsco by signing long-term pre-printed form textile rental
service agreements wherein they state the items they are wanting Alsco to provide. Tr. p. 66 LL
5-8, p. 69 LL 1-3. Alsco claims it will not provide any services until the textile services agreement
is signed. Tr. p. 66 LL 16-23. Alsco has been using the same pre-printed form contract since at
least 2011. Tr. p. 66 L 19 – p. 70 L. 16. The purpose of the form textile services agreement,
according to Alsco, is for the customer to identify which products Alsco will supply. Tr. p. 67 LL
10-15. These items are identified using a detailed “Schedule A,” which is attached to a one-page
“Terms and Conditions” sheet. Tr. Exh. 1. The Terms and Conditions Sheet is in smaller print,
with fifteen enumerated terms containing legalistic language and conditions. Tr. Exh. 1.
In the fine print of the Alsco Contract, under terms and conditions, Alsco includes a section
titled “Term,” which sets forth a five-year auto-renewal clause:
2.
Term. This Agreement shall remain in full force and effect for a period of
60 months, commencing on the date of installation of the goods, and shall be
automatically renewed for consecutive 60 month periods thereafter unless either
party shall give to the other party written notice of termination by registered mail
at least 90 days prior to the expiration of the term then in effect.
Trial Exh. 1. Tr. pp. Tr. p. 66 L 19 – p. 70 L. 16
Another term inserted by Alsco in its form contract obligates any customer who cancels
prior to the expiration of the contract to pay liquidated damages:
8.
Liquidated Damages. Customer acknowledges that since Supplier owns
the goods covered hereby and that such goods may be unique to Customer’s
requirements and that the value of such goods is depreciating with time, the
damages which Supplier may sustain as a result of Customer’s breach or premature
termination of this Agreement would be difficult, if not impossible, to determine.
The parties therefore agree that in the event of Customer’s failure to timely pay the
fees and charges provided for herein, or in the event of any other breach or
premature termination of this Agreement by Customer, Customer shall pay to
Supplier as liquidated damages, and not as a penalty, a sum equal to the number of
unexpired weeks remaining in the term then in effect multiplied by fifty percent
(50%) of the average weekly charge for goods and services during the 10 weeks
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immediately preceding such failure to pay, breach or premature termination. The
parties further agree that this formula is reasonable
Tr. Exh. 1, p. 1.
The Alsco form Textile Services Agreement is an exclusive one – stating that Alsco “shall
be the exclusive supplier to Customer of the services and goods” Tr. Exh. 1.
Despite the fact that the Alsco form contract contains onerous, self-perpetuating clauses
that can bind a company for 5 years or more, Alsco admitted to taking no steps to ensure that the
customer has a fair opportunity for an owner or an owner’s designated representative to review the
agreement. Tr. pp. 88-89. Alsco’s local corporate representative, Mike Ginnetti, testified about
Alsco’s business practices when it comes to obtaining signatures on the required Textile Services
Agreement. It is not Alsco’s practice to learn the identity of the actual owner of a particular
business prior to asking them to sign a long-term textile services agreement, and ownership of the
business is not Alsco’s “concern.” Tr., pp. 88-89. Instead, it has been Alsco’s practice (from 2011
until the time of trial) to have its driver present the long-term contract to whoever appears to be in
charge at the place of business:
Q.

Alsco does business with companies, not individuals, is that true?

A.

That’s true.

Q.
And it’s not Alsco’s concern who owns the business that’s one of their
customers, is that right?
A.
Our main concern is our relationships with our customers and our ability to
keep them happy and provide them with service. We don’t go to the lengths of
finding out who truly does legally own a business.
Q.
You would agree that Alsco is not concerned with who owns a business
that’s your customer?
A.

I would agree that’s not our principal concern, no.
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We

Q.

are dealing in a double negative, but

it’s

a yes,

you agree with what

I

said?

A.

I

Q.

And really Alsco

A.

Deﬁne

Q.

.Well, Ithink that

the

do.

same thing

respect to

doesn’t care

Who owns

the business, correct?

“care.”

was your word and —

as you’re not worried about,

who owns he business

that’s

we can just agree it means
care about, who owns the business with
I

guess

your customer, correct?

That’s agreeable, yeah

A.

And so when Alsco—in your experience when Alsco has a contract that
Q.
looks like Exhibit 1, these form contracts, they don’t ask Who the owner is, right?
A.

We do not.

Q.

And they don’t even

A.

We don’t’

Q.

You just show—Alsco shows a contract that looks like Exhibit

ask

Who

ask

the

Who

the

manager

manager

is,

right?

is.

1

to

whoever

they are delivering the linens t0 and asks for a signature, true?

We ask for a signature and title, yes.

A.
Id.

2.

Tons 0f Fun,

LLC

and Clav Roman.

In 2010, Justin Zora started a

operating a restaurant/bar in

LL

13

— p 30 LL

3.

restaurant/bar in the

State because

downtown Boise which

Tons 0f Fun,

name

company named Tons 0f Fun, LLC,

LLC was owned

it

so.

of

called “Patty’s” (“Tons of Fun”). Tr. p. 29

solely

by

Justin Zora. Id.

“Fatty’s” but failed t0 register this

he was unaware he needed to do

for the purpose

Tr. p. 16

name With

LL

18

— p.

Zora operated the

the Idaho Secretary 0f

17 LL. 14.
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In October of 2010, Tons of Fun employed Defendant Clay Roman to work as an employee
and bar manager at the Fatty’s bar. R. p. 2. It was undisputed Roman was never an owner of Tons
of Fun. Id. On March 3, 2011, Roman was approached by a representative of Alsco during a shift
and, at his request, signed Alsco’s form Textile Services Agreement (“the Alsco Contract”). Tr.
Exh. 1. The signature line on the Alsco Contract has Roman’s signature, and above the signature
Roman’s name is spelled out and the words “partner, owner” are written in the “title” line. Id.
Roman testified Alsco was bringing materials to the Fatty’s bar and he signed the Alsco Contract
“because they were there with material.” Tr. p. 41 LL 7-14. Roman testified that much of the
hand-writing at the bottom of the Alsco Contract was not his and he could not say for certain who
wrote in the words “partner/owner” underneath his signature. Tr. pp. 62 LL 12 – p. 63 LL 6.
Roman did not read the Alsco Contract and explained the circumstances under which he likely
signed it:
Q. Do you remember signing this document?
A. I do not remember signing this document.
Q. Prior to the initiation of this lawsuit, had you ever read this document?
A. I have never read this document.
Q. How do you explain your signature being on the document if you never
read it?
A.
Easy enough. During a typical day when I am inside the bar, this is during the day,
so I can tell you this was signed during the day – the bar opened during the evening – so I
was in there receiving deliveries and I receive several deliveries during the day. So all of
the deliveries would be scheduled for certain days twice a week, which I would go in and
receive those deliveries. My job was to show up, sign that we are receiving the delivery,
and they would leave and I would receive the goods.
...
Q.
So from your testimony, is it fair to say you never talked to anybody from Alsco
about the services?
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That

is fair.

Iknew one person from Alsco.

Who was that?
His name was Toby.

And what was his role

?@POPOP

T0

at

Alsco?

deliver linens.

Did Toby have you signing
It

Tr. pp.

55

LL

5

would be a

—p. 56 LL.

Consistent With

its

this, to

logical guess, but

I

your recollection

don’t recollect.

19.

business practices described above, Alsco admitted that, at the time

Roman signed the Alsco Contract, Alsco did not who owned the Fatty’s bar.

Tr. p.

87

LL 22 — 25.

The Alsco Contract signed by Roman includes a Schedule of Materials Alsco was to
and

service:

80 Bar White towels, 2 laundry bags, one bag stand, 18 mat

8 fragrance cups, 16 fragrance cups, 4 gruerey mats,

Alsco conﬁrmed

that,

slates (of different sizes),

and 4 micro ﬁber

mop

trial

heads.

Tr.

EXh.

1.

under the terms of the contract, the Customer (Tons 0f Fun) could reduce 0r

increase the quantities of the items 0n the Schedule at any time. Tr. EXh.

The

deliver

court concluded

Roman

1.

signed the Alsco Contract not in an individual capacity,

but as an undisclosed principal 0f Tons 0f Fun, LLC. R. p. 150-15 1.

3.

Appellant Fattv’s Bar

Fatty’s Bar,

LLC

LLC & the Masonheimer’s.

(“Fatty’s

LLC”)

is

an Idaho limited

liability

operated by Steve Masonheimer and his wife, Jennie Masonheimer.

2013 With the Idaho Secretary of State. R.
interest in Fatty’s

p. 141.

It

was undisputed

It

company owned and

was formed 0n January

that

4,

Zora had n0 ownership

LLC.
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Steve and Jennie Masonheimer also

LLC, Which previously operated

In

license

it

was using was being suspended

LL

33

Lake Harbor

15-24.

in Boise. R. p. 140.

difﬁculties

and the liquor

for Violations of liquor licensing laws. Tr.

its

down

after

22

LL

New

Fatty’s

Id.

Bar

Year’s Eve business on December 31,

Id.

During the end 0f 2012, Zora was also working for the Masonheimer’s restaurant

at

The

Zora informed Steve Masonheimer of the ﬁnancial difﬁculties and pending closure 0f

Drink.

Fatty’s

Bar and Tons of Fun. Steve Masonheimer testiﬁed he was not

the 01d Fatty’s or

Tons of Fun, LLC, but that he had no desire

backer for Zora. R.

0f opening

— 163 L

their

p.

clear

on who actually owned

to partner With

Zora or be a ﬁnancial

140-141. The Masonheimer’s decided, however, t0 100k into the possibility

own bar

at that location

given their experience in the industry. Tr. pp. 160

LL 22

3.

The Masonheimer’s ultimately decided
The Masonheimer’s searched

name had

not been registered.

to

open

their

own bar

at the

Idaho Street location.

the Idaho Secretary of State’s website and found that the “Fatty’s”

Id.

The Masonheimer’s then formed

Fatty’s Bar,

of 2013 and registered the company With the Idaho Secretary of State.

The Masonheimer’s discovered
Street

18-24.

location lease at the Idaho street location.

Zora searched for a ﬁnancial investor but was unsuccessful.
to shut

The Drink,

Fattv’s bar.

also unable t0 secure a renewal of

and Tons of Fun was scheduled
2012.

limited liability company,

December of 2012, Tons 0f Fun was experiencing ﬁnancial

Tons 0f Fun was
Tr. p.

a restaurant/bar located in

Shutdown 0f Tons 0f Fun and

4.

owned an Idaho

LLC

in January

Id.

the liquor license and other assets at the location

on Idaho

were not owned by Zora 0r Tons 0f Fun, but were instead owned by Colby Smith who had

been leasing the assets t0 Tons 0f Fun. Colby Smith had previously operated a comedy club
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at

that location. Tr. pp. 163 L. 3 – p. 165 L. 23. Fatty’s LLC applied for, and was approved to
purchase, the liquor license from Smith for $135,000.00. Id. Fatty’s LLC also executed an asset
purchase agreement with Smith, pursuant to which Fatty’s LLC purchased all other assets being
used at the Idaho Street location for $40,000.00. Id. It is undisputed that when Tons of Fun shut
down in December of 2012, Fatty’s LLC did not purchase any assets from Zora or Tons of Fun,
LLC. Id.
Fatty’s LLC interviewed the prior employees of Tons of Fun and hired some, but not all of
the employees. They agreed to hire Zora as a bar manager. They refused to hire any of the security
guards because of the liquor license violations by Tons of Fun. Tr. p. 165 L 24 – p. 166 L 19.
Fatty’s LLC spent approximately $20,000 remodeling the interior of its new bar. Id. Fatty’s LLC
signed a five-year lease with the owner of the Idaho Street location. Tr. pp. 165 L 4 – 23.
Approximately 30-45 days after Tons of Fun shut down the old Fatty’s bar, Fatty’s LLC opened
up the remodeled restaurant/bar for business. Id.
Zora worked for Fatty’s LLC as an employee for approximately six months, or until August
6, 2013, at which time he was fired for suspected embezzlement. At the time he was fired, Zora
claimed ownership to some of the equipment being used at the Fatty’s LLC location. Tr., p. 254,
L. 15 – p. 254, L. 8. Jennie Masonheimer testified as follows:
He claimed – had claimed to own some of the equipment that we believed we had
already purchased, specifically the Fatty’s sign, and we wanted to make sure that
he felt that anything he could come back for, any other items, that everything was
covered. So we paid him for basically the Fatty’s sign, which is what he claimed
to own.
Tr., p. 256, L. 19 – P. 257, L 11.
The Masonheimer’s decided to pay off Zora for any equipment in which he claimed an
interest. Tr. pp. 167-168. Zora and Steve Masonheimer signed a one paragraph agreement entitled
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“Fatty’s

Bar

LLC Agreement,” dated August 6, 2013, which is eight months after Tons 0f Fun and

the 01d Fatty’s bar shut

down.

Tr.

Exh.

8.

The Agreement

states:

member 0f Patty’s Bar LLC am purchasing the physical
equipment located at 800 W. Idaho as listed below owned by Tons of Fun
LLC/Justin Zora for $10,000. Two payments have already been made in the
I

Steve Masonheimer, as a

amount of $5,000. Iwill pay $2,500 0n August 10, 2013 and the ﬁnal payment of
$2,500 on September 10, 2013. Justin Zora/Tons of Fun LLC must agree t0 stop
all use 0f the name Fatty’s Bar and/or claim any afﬁliation With Fatty’s Bar as the
name is legally owned and registered by Fatty’s Bar LLC in the state of Idaho.
1d.

Fattv’s

5.

LLC’s Dealings With

After Fatty’s

LLC

providing linen services
deliveries

opened for business the same Alsco driver delivered linens

The Masonheimer’s were

restaurant.

at

contacted Alsco and provided a

for

them

until

payment.

familiar With Alsco’s services because Alsco

The Drink.

from Alsco and eventually

t0 the address for

Alsco.

Id.

March of 2017.

new

set

Fatty’s

LLC

up a new account with Alsco.

had been

therefore accepted

Jennie Masonheimer

address for invoices and requested monthly invoices be sent

Fatty’s

It

171 L. 4-21.

Tr. p.

to its

LLC

continued to accept Alsco’s linen services and paid

was undisputed

Fatty’s

LLC paid for all

services received

from

Alsco.

Jennie Masonheimer did contact Alsco and informed them 0f new ownership and requested
invoices be sent to a different address. Jennie

billed Fatty’s

in

LLC monthly.

Tr. p.

95

LL — p.

Masonheimer also changed the billings so
96

LL 3.

92

LL

Alsco

Alsco admitted it knew there was a change

ownership and that the Fatty’s bar owned by Tons of Fun had shut

Tr. p.

that

7-25. Alsco, however, did not approach anyone at Fatty’s

down

for a period of time.

LLC

about signing one 0f
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its Textile Services Agreements. Id. Tr. p., 171 LL 4-9. Likewise, Alsco did not even inform
Fatty’s LLC about the Alsco Contract signed by Roman. Id.
In early 2017, the current manager of Fatty’s LLC, Ryan Andrews, was approached by the
Alsco driver and told that the current contract had expired and the business needed to sign a new
contract. Tr. p. 287, L. 3-20. At that same time Andrews did some research and determined Fatty’s
LLC could obtain linen services for a much lower cost from a different vendor and recommended
a change to the Masonheimers. Tr. p. 287 LL 21-25 – p. 288 LL 1-10. Fatty’s LLC then decided
to switch linen service providers and informed the Alsco driver they were switching. Id.
Alsco soon informed the Masonheimers they were in breach of contract and could not
cancel the contract. At Steve Masonheimer’s request, Alsco forwarded to him a copy of the Alsco
Contract signed by Roman in 2011. Tr. p. 173, LL 9-21. Despite the explanation that no one from
Fatty’s Bar, LLC, had ever signed this contract, Alsco promptly filed a lawsuit to recover
liquidated damages. R. pp. 26-27. No evidence was presented to show that the Masonheimers
were aware of the Alsco Contract when Fatty’s LLC opened for business – or until they were made
aware in March of 2017, when Fatty’s Bar, LLC determined it no longer wanted the services of
Alsco. Tr. p. 156 LL 15- P. 157 L. 1.
Alsco did present evidence that “The Drink” had an identical contract to the Alsco Contract
signed by Roman in 2011. Tr. p. 45 LL 2 – p. 46 LL 3. The Drink contract was also signed by
Clay Roman on August 1, 2012 while he was working for The Drink. Tr. Exh. 5. The word
“owner” was also written under Roman’s name on the Alsco Contract with The Drink. However,
Roman testified he did not write the word “owner” on the The Drink Contract. Roman testified
he was not aware he was signing a long-term contract with Alsco on behalf of the Drink, but
instead thought that he was signing to accept linen services for the Drink. Id. It was undisputed
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Roman was never an owner in the Drink and would not have had the authority as an employee to
sign a long-term textile services agreement. Tr. p. 63 LL 9- p. 64 L. 10.
C.

Course of Proceedings.
Alsco filed a Verified Complaint on May 2, 2017 naming Clay Roman, an individual d/b/a

Fatty’s; and Fatty’s LLC as defendants. R. pp. 10-13. Alsco then filed an Amended Complaint
on May 3, 2017 changing the name of the defendants to Clay Roman d/b/a Fatty’s and Fatty’s Bar,
LLC. R. pp. 24-28. Defendant Fatty’s Bar LLC filed a motion for summary judgment, which
motion was denied by the district court. Aug. R. p. 001 – 015.
The case then proceeded to a court trial on April 10 and 11, 2018. Alsco presented
testimony from four witnesses: Mike Ginnetti; Justin Zora, via deposition testimony; Defendant
Clay Roman and Steve Masonheimer. Fatty’s LLC made a motion for a directed verdict following
the close of Alsco’s case, which was denied. Tr. pp. 183-243.
On July 23, 2018, the trial court issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. R. pp.
138-156. The trial court reached the conclusion Fatty’s Bar LLC was liable for breach of the Alsco
Contract under the theory of successor liability. A Judgment was rendered against Fatty’s LLC
for liquidated damages in the amount of $23,206.46 on July 23, 2018.
The district court also concluded Clay Roman was liable to Alsco as an undisclosed
principal of Tons of Fun, LLC. The district court issued a judgment against Clay Roman for the
same amount, $23,206,46. R. p. 157. The district court found Roman and Fatty’s LLC to be
jointly and severally liable for this amount to Alsco. Id.
Fatty’s LLC filed a motion for reconsideration on August 6, 2018. Aug. R. p. 12-14. This
motion was denied by the district court on October 4, 2018. Aug. R. pp. 26-41. The district court
awarded Alsco its costs of $1,513.37 and its fees of $26,766.00. Id.
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II.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

Fatty’s LLC presents the following assignments of error on appeal:
1.

Did the district court err in determining Fatty’s Bar, LLC is a successor in interest

to Tons of Fun, LLC?
2.

Did the district court err in determining Fatty’s Bar, LLC impliedly assumed the

debts or liabilities of Tons of Fun, LLC?
3.

Did the district court err in determining the automatic renewal provision in the

contract between Tons of Fun, LLC and Alsco is not subject to the statue of frauds when applied
to Fatty’s Bar, LLC which did not sign the contract?
4.

Did the district court err in finding Alsco had met its burden of proof to be awarded

liquidated damages?
5.

Did the district court err when it awarded costs and fees against Fatty’s LLC?

6.

Did the district court err when awarded costs and fee against Fatty’s LLC in a

disproportionate amount to the award against Roman, without any attempt by Alsco to segregate
the fees between these two parties?
Fatty’s LLC presents the following additional issue on appeal:
7.

The Court Should Award Fatty’s LLC its Costs and Fees on Appeal.
III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court exercises free review over the district court's conclusions of law." J.R. Simplot
Co. v. Western Heritage Ins. Co., 132 Idaho 582, 584, 977 P.2d 196 (1999); Opportunity, L.L.C.
v. Ossewarde, 136 Idaho 602, 605, 38 P.3d 1258, 1261 (2002). The standard of review of a nonjury trial court's findings of fact is set forth in Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) which states:
In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury ... the court shall find the facts
specifically and state separately its conclusions of law thereon and direct the entry
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of the appropriate judgment. Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous. In application of this principle regard shall be given to the special
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of those witnesses that appear
before it.
Id. (quoting I.R.C.P. 52(a)). When determining whether a finding is clearly erroneous this Court
does not weigh the evidence but inquires whether the findings of fact are supported by
substantial and competent evidence. Id. Evidence is regarded as substantial if a reasonable trier
of fact would accept it and rely upon it in determining whether a disputed point of fact had been
proven. Id.
IV.
A.

ARGUMENT

The District Court Erred When It Found Fatty’s LLC is a Successor In Interest to
Tons of Fun, LLC Because Alsco Failed to Plead a Successor Liability Claim.
The district court concluded Fatty’s LLC is a successor in interest to Tons of Fun, LLC.

R. 000144-000145. However, Alsco failed to plead a successor liability claim. Instead, Alsco
plead that Fatty’s LLC was a successor in interest to Clay Roman, d/b/a Fatty’s, and that the
succession happened sometime in 2013. R. 000025. In the First Amended Complaint filed May
3, 2017 Alsco plead as follows:
8. Upon information and belief, FATTY’S BAR, LLC became the successor to
Clay Roman d/b/a Fatty’s in 2013.
R. p. 24-27. The Amended Complaint does not refer in any way to Tons of Fun, LLC. Id.
Alsco did not amend or attempt to amend the Amended Complaint to include a breach of
contract claim against Fatty’s LLC as successor to Tons of Fun, LLC. Because Alsco had never
plead that Fatty’s LLC is a successor in interest to Tons of Fun, LLC, the Court erred in finding
that Fatty’s LLC was liable for the contractual obligation entered into by Tons of Fun, LLC. As
this Court wrote in Youngblood v. Higbee , 145 Idaho 665, 182 P.3d 1199 (2008):
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While we will make every intendment to sustain a complaint that is defective, e.g.,
wrongly captioned or inartful, a complaint cannot be sustained if it fails to make a
short and plain statement of a claim upon which relief may be granted. . . . We look
at whether the complaint puts the adverse party on notice of the claims brought
against it.
Id., 145 at 668, 182 P.3d at 1202, citing Gibson v. Ada Cnty Sheriff's Dep't, 139 Idaho 5, 9, 72 P.3d
845, 849 (2003).
In Mortensen v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co., 149 Idaho 437, 235 P.3d 387 (2010), the Court
held that a claim for quasi-estoppel was improperly plead because the complaint did not contain
the claim in the body of the complaint or prayer for relief. Id., 149 Idaho at 444. This Court stated
the claim was waived by the plaintiff even though the trial court had addressed the substance of
the claim in a motion for summary judgment and motion for reconsideration:
This Court has already expressly rejected the notion that an unpleaded claim can
be preserved for appeal merely because the district court addressed the claim's
merits. Pleading is necessary to put the opposing party on notice of the claims it
is facing and thereby " insure that a just result is accomplished. . . . An unpleaded
cause of action simply cannot be considered, whether on summary judgment or on
appeal. . . . For example, in Beco v. City of Idaho Falls, 124 Idaho 859, 865 P.2d
950 (1993), this Court refused to consider the appellant's unpleaded breach-ofcontract claim despite the fact that the district court ruled on the claim's merits.
Id.
As stated above, at no time during the pendency of this lawsuit did Alsco plead that
Fatty’s LLC was a successor in interest to Tons of Fun, LLC. Instead, Alsco consistently took
the position Fatty’s LLC became a successor to Clay Roman d/b/a Fatty’s in 2013. R., 00025.
Yet the district court made an express finding Fatty’s Inc. was a successor in interest to Tons of
Fun, LLC. R. pp. 9-10. The district court erred in doing so because Alsco waived this claim.
After the trial court’s findings and conclusions were entered, Fatty’s LLC promptly
moved for reconsideration arguing the ruling could not stand because Alsco had never plead such
a claim. Aug. R. pp. 12-20. Alsco filed a Memorandum filed in Opposition to the Motion for
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Reconsideration, however, Alsco did not address

was a successor
Fatty’s

t0

position that Fatty’s Bar

stating, “[a]s is often the case

LLC became

0f Fatty’s LLC.

argument was revealed in
its

pre-trial brief,

The

district court

notice

failure to plead the

Tons of Fun. R. Aug. pp. 22-25. Nonetheless, the

LLC’s argument

t0 the formation

its

its

.”
.

that

district court rej ected

following discovery, Alsco later took the

opposition

p. 3 1.

The

district court further stated “this

memorandum to

Fatty’s

motion for summary judgment,

jury instructions and opening statement.” Aug. R.

by the pleadings

is

p.,

031 (emphasis added).

a notice pleading state and “Fatty’s Bar

Alsco sought

t0

hold

it

liable

LLC was put 0n

under the contract under a successor

theory of liability, even if Alsco initially guessed wrong 0n the predecessor’s identity.”

Yet Alsco’s representative testiﬁed he discovered prior
that

LLC

a successor in interest t0 whatever entity ran Fatty’s prior

Aug. R.

reasoned that Idaho

claim that Fatty’s

t0 the time the lawsuit

Id.

wasﬁled

Tons of Fun was the owner 0f the business called Fatty’s When the Alsco Contract was

signed. Tr. pp. 89

LL

maintained Fatty’s

LLC was

12-20. In addition, a close review of the record

LLC was

argue Fatty’s

Roman

rental

0f textile supplies.” R. 000059. Thus,

executed a Contract, on behalf of a bar

Alsco was

arguing Clay

prior t0

trial,

1

Memorandum in Opposition t0

still

Fatty’s

at the

for

is

known

either in the

Amended

For example, in Alsco’s pre-

contained in the fact section

as:

as Fatty’s, with Alsco, Inc. for the

time the pretrial brief was ﬁled only weeks

Roman was

Motion

LLC,

district courtl.

the only reference to the predecessor corporation

“Clay

Alsco’s

d/b/a Fatty’s.” Alsco simply does not

a successor in interest to Tons of Fun,

Complaint or in the documents referenced by the
trial brief,

Roman

a successor t0 “Clay

shows Alsco consistently

acting

0n behalf of a bar known

Summary Judgment

states, “Fatty’s

Bar

as Fatty’s

LLC was

simply an entity change effected When Masonheimer became involved with the then owner/operator 0f the existing
Fatty’s bar.” Aug. p., 007. Alsco ﬁlrther argues, “Rather, the undisputed facts show that Fatty’s Bar, LLC was

formed With the owner 0f the then existing Fatty’s Bar which was owned and operated by Tons 0f Fun, LLC.” Aug.
However, nowhere does Alsco state that Fatty’s LLC became a successor in interest t0 Tons 0f Fun, LLC.

p. 008.
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when he

signed the Alsco Contract, and there

district court

abused

its

discretion

n0 mention of Tons of Fun, LLC.2 Again, the

is

and prejudiced Fatty’s LLC’s

on Fatty’s Which was not supported by the evidence presented
Alsco carried the burden 0f proof at
predecessor corporation in

only stated a successor

its

When it imposed

a liability

at trial.

and Alsco was required

to

name

the correct

pleadings in order t0 sustain a successor liability claim. Alsco

liability

Fatty’s, 0r “the 01d Fatty’s bar.”

involving Tons 0f Fun,

trial,

rights

claim against Fatty’s

LLC

as a successor to

Alsco never properly stated a successor

LLC. The

district court erred in

Alsco therefore waived any claim that Fatty’s
successor in interest t0 Tons 0f Fun,

LLC. The

Clay

liability

Roman d/b/a
claim

holding otherwise.

LLC was liable for breach of contract as

district court’s

ﬁnding and

a

legal conclusion

should therefore be set aside as an abuse of discretion.

B.

The District Court Erred When
Tons 0f Fun, LLC.
It is

Found

Fatty’s

LLC

Is

a Successor In Interest t0

well settled law that the purchaser 0f a corporation’s assets

and obligations of the

any future

It

liabilities

seller corporation.

which did not

have recognized four exceptions to

The purpose 0f the doctrine

exist at the time

this general rule

is

is

not liable for the debts
t0 relieve the parties

of succession. Courts in other jurisdictions

and found a successor corporation

held liable When: (1) the buyer expressly 0r impliedly agrees to assume such
transaction

amounts

to a

liability.”

See Welco Indus.,

3d 344, 346-47, 617 N.E.2d 1129, 1132. See

2

Because

this

was a bench

trial,

Inc.

v.

is

may be

liability; (2)

de facto consolidation or merger; (3) the buyer corporation

continuation 0f the seller corporation; 0r (4) the transaction

purpose 0f escaping

0f

is

the

merely a

entered into fraudulently for the

Applied Cos., 1993-Ohi0-191, 67 Ohio

also, In re Thorotrast Cases,

26

St.

Phila. 479, 488

the jury instructions are immaterial.
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(1994);
Int’l

HRWSyS.

v.

Wash. Gas Light C0., 823 F. Supp. 318, 327 (D. Md. 1993); Lopez

Mach. Corp, No. CIV 15-0193 JB/GBW, 2017 U.S.

Dist.

LEXIS 114656,

at

v.

Delta

*99 (D.N.M.

July 24, 2017)).

The primary purpose of the corporate successor
selling corporations

ownership. See

0f successor

New

liability

from fraudulently evading
York

v.

liability doctrine is to

prevent buying and

Nat'l Servs. Indus., 352 F.3d 682, 692 (2d Cir. 2003).

has been eroded over time and

W. Kuney, The Taxonomy and

change in

their current liabilities through a

is

The doctrine

narrowly construed by most courts. George

Evaluation 0f Successor Liability (Revisited), Transactions: The

Tennessee Journal ofBusiness Law, V01. 18

p.

740 (2017).

In order to sustain a claim for successor liability, Alsco carried the burden of proof t0 ﬁrst

show that Fatty’s LLC was a successor in interest t0 Tons 0f Fun, LLC; and second t0 demonstrate
the case falls into one 0f the four exceptions t0 the rule that a purchasing corporation

is

for the selling corporation’s debts in an asset purchase.

facts to the

Applying the undisputed

not liable

relevant law, Alsco’s successor liability claim fails as a matter of law. First, Alsco failed t0 prove

Fatty’s

claim

LLC

fails

is

a successor corporation to

Tons 0f Fun. Second, the implied assumption of debt

because there was insufﬁcient evidence that Fatty’s

Tons 0f Fun, LLC’s

LLC

intended to assume any 0f

debt.
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The doctrine of successor liability is not applicable because
purchasing corporation of Tons of Fun, LLC.

1.

The
that

district court

Where one company

company, the

latter is

(emphasis added). The

0r substantially

all

Fattv’s

LLC

recognized that “[t]he well-settled general rule 0f successor
sells

is

not a

liability is

or otherwise transfers all 0r substantially all ofits assets t0 another

not liable for the debts and
district court

liabilities

0f the transferor.”

then erroneously concluded that Fatty’s

of the assets from Tons of Fun, LLC.

LLC

000144

R.,

purchased

However, there was n0 evidence

all

to

support this conclusion.

was undisputed during

It

party not

named

in this suit

trial that

— Colby Smith

Fatty’s

LLC

purchased

all

assets Fatty’s

(“Smith”). R., 000141. Fatty’s

LLC

from a

third

executed an asset

purchase agreement With Smith and paid him $130,000 for the liquor license and an additional

$40,000 for what Steve Masonheimer considered to be
Id.

Alsco presented n0 evidence t0 refute

LLC. The

district court

The
eight

8.

“Fatty’s

months

abused

Bar

discretion

LLC Agreement”

Tons of Fun shut down

after

The written agreement

the agreement.

its

this asset

states that

it

its

upon by Alsco and

bar and Fatty’s

for purchase

in

LLC

Q. So

I’ll

the stack

I

the

Idaho Street location.

trial

opened

court

the matter.

was executed

for business.

Tr.

EXh.

0f the physical equipment designated in

any manner

that

it

was

for the purchase

0f

of the assets of Tons of Fun, LLC. Alsco did not present any evidence t0

show What Tons 0f Fun LLC owned as 0f August 2, 2013. Even Zora
as a bill 0f sale for

at the

purchase agreement between Smith and Fatty’s

But the agreement does not indicate

“all or substantially all”

0fthe assets

by ignoring uncontradicted evidence on

relied

was

all

some equipment and not an

characterizes this agreement

asset purchase of Tons of Fun,

show you what has been marked as Exhibit 8, Which was
passed out. Do you recognize that document?

LLC:

the last one in

A. Correct.
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Q. Can you identify what that document is?
A. It’s basically just a bill of sale for all the physical scenarios that, like I said, we had
incurred over the years.
Tr., 27:8-15(emphasis added).
Zora further testified:
Q. If you look at the Exhibit 8, this is---Mr. Masonheimer, at this time was agreeing to
purchase from you inventory?
A. Correct.
Q. Okay. And that was inventory that had been left at the bar known as Fatty’s after it
shut down at the end of December, 2012, and then it was left there when Ms. Masonheimer
reopened it in about February of 2013, correct?
A. Well, it wasn’t left there in the sense of abandonment.
Q. Oh, sure.
A. It was used in the sense of we’re this new venture.
Q. It was left at the physical location?
A. Sure.
Tr., 34:13-24 (emphasis added).
Further, Jennie Masonheimer testified that the circumstances surrounding the execution of
Exhibit 8 was essentially a payoff to get Zora to go away peacefully:
Q. Were you involved in the decision to essentially fire Mr. Zora from
Fatty’s?
A. Yes.
Q. What do you recall about that?
A. I handle all the books, reconcile the deposits and those kids of things,
and several of the deposits were missing money, and when I approached
Mr. Zora to discuss it, he said that it was from employee back shortages,
and when I approached the employees about it, they were quite adamant
that that was not the case. So after discussing with Steve, we hired a
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come in, and after his research, he said that Justin
had been taking money from the business, so we decided that we needed
private investigator to

t0 part

Tr. p.

ways.

254 L 15 —p. 255 L

4.

Jennie Masonheimer then testiﬁed they paid Zora

money

at that

time because he claimed

ownership to the “Fatty’s sign” and they wanted t0 make sure he could not come back against
Fatty’s

LLC.

256 L 19 — p. 257 L

Tr. p.

11.

Jennie Masonheimer’s credibility and testimony

was never

uncontradicted testimony of a credible witness must be accepted

testimony

is

some way.

inherently improbable or impeached in

by

The

called into question.

the trier of fact unless the

State ofldaho

v.

Miller, 131 Idaho

288, 295, 955 P.2d 603, 610 (Ct. App. 1997).

The

district court therefore

erroneously assumed, with n0 evidence presented, that Fatty’s

LLC purchased all 0r substantially all 0f the
LLC was

concluded Fatty’s

assets

a successor of

of Tons of Fun, LLC, and thereby erroneously

Tons 0f Fun, LLC.

discretion in the matter and thereby prejudiced Fatty’s

abused

its

C.

The

District

Court Erred

R.,

000144-000145. The court

LLC’S

When It Determined Fatty’s LLC

rights.

Assumed

Impliedly

the

Contract with Alsco.

Assuming
an error for the

this

trial

Court ﬁnds that Fatty’s

court to hold that Fatty’s

Contract. R., 000145-000147.

Tons of Fun,
148.

The

LLC

LLC was

The

district court

LLC

a successor to Tons of Fun,

other exception. Id.

did not

ﬁnd

that Fatty’s

Fatty’s Will therefore

concluded that Fatty’s

LLC was

conﬁne

its

it

was

impliedly assumed liability for the Alsco

LLC was the successor 0f

under the “implied assumption” exception t0 successor

district court

LLC,

liability.

a successor t0 Tons 0f

analysis

on appeal mainly

R. pp. 138-

Fun under any

t0 the “implied

assumption” exception.
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An
903

implied agreement 0f assumption

Supp. 2d 654, 664

F.

assignor’s liabilities

is

(ND.

Ill.

is

a creature of contract.

Thornton

never presumed, and the burden of proof is upon the party

been an assumption. Murr

1309

(Ct.

App. 1987). Alsco needed

LLC

to

v.

M7 Aero.

LP,

Under Idaho law, “[a]n assignee’s assumption of an

2012).

there has

v.

Who

asserts that

Selag Corporation, 113 Idaho 773, 7809, 747 P.2d 1302,

t0 present

some evidence demonstrating an

pay the debts 0f Tons 0f Fun, LLC. Factors demonstrating an

intent t0

intent

by

Fatty’s

pay the debts of

another person or entity include (1) admissions of liability by ofﬁcers 0r other spokesmen of the

upon

buyer, as well as (2) the effect of the transfer

Corp.

Countrywide

v.

debt payment

Home
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relationship between the asset purchaser (Fatty’s LLC) and the party with whom the asset seller
(Tons of Fun, LLC) entered into a contract with (Alsco). In other words, the district court
incorrectly focused on the actions and relationship between Fatty’s LLC and Alsco. Instead, the
district court should have focused on the relationship between Fatty’s LLC and Tons of Fun, LLC.
Alsco presented no evidence to show an implied agreement by Fatty’s LLC to assume the debts of
Tons of Fun, LLC. Fatty’s LLC was a new entity with minimal connections to Tons of Fun. When
asked during trial why it sued Fatty’s and not Tons of Fun, Alsco’s representative testified it was
because Tons of Fun was “not the last one receiving services under the agreement.” Tr. p. 98 LL
8-14.
Alsco presented no evidence that any representative of Fatty’s LLC made any statements
or demonstrated any conduct showing it would assume or be liable for the obligations under the
Alsco Contract to Tons of Fun, LLC or Justin Zora. The actions of Fatty’s LLC in accepting the
linens delivered to it by Alsco and paying the invoices submitted by Alsco cannot meet the burden
of proving Fatty’s LLC agreed to assume a five-year contract with an auto-renewal clause. Further,
there is a danger in imposing successor liability on purchasing corporations for the performance
of automatic contract renewal clauses. Doing so goes beyond the prophylactic purpose of
successor liability, which is to stop current debt or liability evasions, and encourages litigation
over debts which did not exist at the time of the succession.
The case of Zantel Marketing Agency v. Whitesell Corp. 696 N.W.2d 735 (Mich.App.
2005) is on point in this regard. In that case, Stamptech and Zantel entered into an exclusive, tenyear marketing contract in 1996. In August of 1998, WOM (one of the defendants) purchased the
assets of Stamptech through an Asset Sale Agreement, whereby it was agreed that WOM would
purchase “substantially all of Stamptech’s assets, including its name, receivables, equipment,
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patents and business lease.” Id. at 737. It was further expressly stated in the agreement that seller
(Stamptech) would remain liable for all obligations and debts arising on or prior to the closing
date, and that purchaser (WOM) would remain liable for all debts and obligations arising after the
closing date. Id. at 738. After the closing, Zantel received oral assurances from WOM that their
marketing agreement would remain unchanged. Further, Zantel continued marketing WOM and
commission checks were made payable to Zantel and WOM continued to send correspondence
using the prior company, Stamptech’s, letterhead. Id. at 741. Eventually, the marketing contract
between Zantel and defendant was prematurely terminated and Zantel sued for breach of contract,
while the defendants argued there was no successor liability, express or implied. Id. at 739. The
court rejected the successor liability claim holding there was no implied assumption of liability
despite the actions of the parties. Id. at 741.
Applying the same reasoning here, the fact that Fatty’s LLC continued to accept services
from Alsco and paid for them is not a sufficient basis to conclude that Fatty’s LLC impliedly
assumed the contract liability Tons of Fun, LLC incurred. The district court abused its discretion
by imposing successor liability on Fatty’s LLC despite the lack of an implied agreement for debt
assumption with Tons of Fun, LLC.
It is important to remember the underlying rationale for the successor liability doctrine,
i.e., the payment of accrued “debts.” The only Alsco debt which Fatty’s LLC was capable of
assuming at the time of its 2013 business formation was the balance of the 60-month Tons of
Fun/Alsco Contract. At that time, Tons of Fun—the only party to the contract with Alsco—went
out of business and had stopped making payments on its 60-month contract. Thus, Tons of Fun’s
remaining contract debt to Alsco was in default and only the balance of the unpaid installments
could be passed on to Fatty’s LLC as a successor. “A cause of action for breach of contract accrues
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Even if Fatty’s LLC was a successor to Tons of Fun, LLC, Fatty’s LLC could not be liable
for more than the amount of assets it purchased from Tons of Fun. As this Court once explained:
“The law seems to be well settled, that those who take over the business and assets of a dissolved
corporation, take it subject to the debts and liabilities of the corporation, to the full extent of the
value of the property taken over.” Radermacher v. Daniels, 64 Idaho 376, 380, 133 P.2d 713, 715
(1943). The district court therefore erred in holding Fatty’s LLC liable for liquidated damages to
Alsco when that amount clearly exceeds the amount of assets which Fatty’s received from Tons
of Fun.
Fatty’s LLC is aware that many appellate courts review successor liability claims for an
abuse of discretion. See Ind. Elec. Workers Pension Ben. Fund v. ManWeb Servs., 884 F.3d 770
(7th Cir. 2018), and Baker v. Delta Air Lines, 6 F.3d 632 (9th Cir. 1993). Under these review
standards, Fatty’s LLC believes that the district court abused its discretion by imposing successor
liability for the Tons of Fun contract. This error is subject to appellate review under a fourpronged abuse of discretion test: “When this Court reviews an alleged abuse of discretion by a
trial court the sequence of inquiry requires consideration of four essentials. Whether the trial
court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries
of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices
available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason.” Lunneborg v. My Fun
Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018).
The district court abused its discretion under the third prong of this test because it failed
to apply correct legal standards in finding that Fatty’s LLC was the successor to Tons of Fun,
LLC. Also, the district court abused its discretion under the fourth prong of the test because it did
not exercise a reasoned choice by finding that being a successor to Clay Roman, a non-owner of
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Tons of Fun, LLC, was the same thing as being a successor to Tons of Fun, LLC as an entity. As
a result, Fatty’s LLC suffered prejudice to its substantial rights. See I.R.C.P. 61. Alsco did not
present enough evidence at trial to support its successor liability theory, and the court erred in
making a legal ruling which was not supported by the evidence. See Browning v. Ringel, 134
Idaho 6, 10, 995 P.2d 351, 355 (2000) (findings of fact in an action tried by the court must be
supported by substantial and competent evidence). Fatty’s had a right to entry of judgment based
on the evidence at trial.
D.

The District Court Erred When it Determined the Statute Of Frauds Was
Inapplicable to the Alsco Contract.
If the terms of a contract are clear and unambiguous, the interpretation of their meaning

and legal effect are questions of law. Idaho v. Hosey, 134 Idaho 883, 886, 11 P.3d 1101, 1104
(2000) (citations omitted). The meaning of an unambiguous contract must be determined from the
plain meaning of the words. Id. Where, however, the contract is deemed to be ambiguous,
"interpretation of the contract is a question of fact that focuses on the intent of the parties." Id.
"Whether the facts establish a violation of the contract is a question of law over which this Court
exercises free review." Id
Fatty’s Bar, LLC asserts the successor liability claims by Alsco are barred by Idaho’s
Statute of Frauds. Idaho Code § 9-505(1)(2) requires the following type of contract to be in writing
and subscribed (i.e., signed) by the party charged with performance of the contract: “a. a contract
that by its terms is not to be performed within a year from its making.” Because the Alsco Contract
at issue is for a duration of consecutive five-year terms, it falls squarely within the statute of frauds.
The statute of frauds applies even if successor liability is found to exist pursuant to the implied
assumption exception, given that assumption is a contract theory. One of the stated purposes of
Idaho’s statute of frauds is to prevent creditors from trying to enforce unwritten, un-signed
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promises to pay or answer for the debts of another person or entity.
The district court agreed that the Alsco Contract with Tons of Fun, LLC was for a fiveyear term and, as such, was required to be in writing and subscribed by the party charged or his
agent. R., 000152. The district court erred, however, when it determined in this case that under
the theory of successor liability imputed by implied assumption, an agreement falling within the
statute of frauds need not be separately subscribed by the successor business to be enforceable. Id.
The district court relied upon Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc. v. Gateway Funding for the proposition
that when a contract satisfies the statue of frauds vis-à-vis the predecessor company, then it can be
enforced against a successor in interest and does not pose a statute of frauds problem. 942
F.Supp.2d 516 (E.D. Pa. 2013), R., 000152. The Lehman Bros. opinion, however, expressly
applies to those claims of successor liability based on the de facto merger doctrine. (“If the jury
finds the existence of a de facto merger, then by definition Gateway assumes Arlington’s written
liabilities.” Id. at 533). This opinion does not stand for the proposition that a successor “steps into
the shoes” of a predecessor for every contract the predecessor signed when there is implied
assumption and no de facto merger, or any common ownership.
Importantly, the district court found that there was no de facto merger between or mere
continuation of Fatty’s LLC and Tons of Fun, LLC. R. pp. 147-148. De facto merger is an entirely
different exception to the successor liability doctrine than implied assumption. As acknowledged
by the district court, the doctrine of de facto merger is an equitable doctrine that recognizes that
successor liability may attach “where one corporation is absorbed by another, but without
compliance with the statutory requirements for a merger.” United States v. Sterling Centrecorp
Inc., 960 F.Supp.2d 1025, 1041 (E.D. Cal. 2013)(citations and quotes omitted). R., 000147. A de
facto merger is characterized by: 1) a continuation of the enterprise of the seller corporation; 2) a
continuity of shareholders; 3) the seller corporation ceasing its ordinary business operations and
liquidating; and 4) the purchasing corporation assumes those obligations of the seller ordinarily
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necessary for the uninterrupted continuation of normal business. Sterling Centrecorp Inc., 960
F.Supp.2d at 1041-42.
Under these circumstances, it only makes sense that, as a matter of law, when there is a de
facto merger (as there was in Lehman Bros.), express or implied assumption should occur and the
statute of frauds is thereby bypassed. A de facto merger is essentially the same corporation existing
in an alternative form and is most likely done with the intent to escape liability from creditors.
Thus, it does not make sense, nor does Lehman Bros. stand for the proposition, that where there is
an implied assumption, as a matter of law all liabilities are assumed despite the requirements of
the statute of frauds.
Fatty’s LLC is not liable to Alsco for liquidated damages for several other reasons:
First, Fatty’s LLC is not liable to Alsco on the renewed Alsco Contract because it did not
have a “meeting of the minds” with Alsco on the material terms of the contract. “The ‘meeting of
the minds’ must occur on all material terms to the contract.” Barry v. Pac. W. Constr., Inc., 140
Idaho 827, 831, 103 P.3d 440, 444 (2004). In Fatty’s LLC’s case, there is no evidence that Fatty’s
LLC was aware of, or accepted, the contract renewal clause. Silence on the matter is not sufficient,
as Fatty’s LLC did not negotiate or sign the original contract with the renewal clause. Idaho case
law is clear: “Silence ordinarily does not establish acceptance without knowledge that silence is a
mode of acceptance and the offeree intends to accept…A party cannot state an agreement on his
own terms and unilaterally form a contract.” Figueroa v. Kit-San Co., 123 Idaho 149, 156-57, 845
P.2d 567, 570 (Ct. App. 1992). Alsco could not unilaterally impose the terms of the Alsco Contract
onto Fatty’s LLC without Fatty’s LLC’s express acceptance of all the material terms.
Second, the Alsco Contract was non-assignable because it was a personal services contract.
The contract’s primary purpose was to furnish lines and other cleaning services. “Generally, an
executory contract for personal services cannot be specifically enforced.” Byrne v. Morley, 78
Idaho 172, 176, 299 P.2d 758, 760 (1956). Moreover, personal service contracts fall naturally
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within the Idaho Statute of Frauds: “The rule is firmly established by the great weight of authority
that a contract for personal services which by its terms are to be rendered for a period in excess of
one year is within the meaning of the statutory provision requiring contracts not to be performed
within a year to be in writing.” Allen v. Moyle, 84 Idaho 18, 23, 367 P.2d 579, 582 (1961).
Third, the Alsco Contract is not subject to a part-performance exception to the Idaho Statute
of Frauds. Idaho case law is clear: “There is no literal foundation in I.C. § 9-505 for the oft-made
assertion that part performance takes a contract outside the statute. Plainly it does not… The
doctrine of part performance is best understood as a specific form of the more general principle of
equitable estoppel.” Frantz v. Parke, 111 Idaho 1005, 1009, 729 P.2d 1068, 1072 (Ct. App. 1986).
At trial, Alsco failed to show the elements of equitable estoppel and thus did not remove
the parties’ contract (and alleged contract renewal) from the Idaho Statute of Frauds:
The essential elements of equitable estoppel…are: (1) Conduct which amounts to a false
representation or concealment of material facts, or, at least, which is calculated to convey
the impression that the facts are otherwise than, and inconsistent with, those which the
party subsequently attempts to assert; (2) intention, or at least expectation, that such
conduct shall be acted upon by the other party; (3) knowledge, actual or con-structive, of
the real facts. As related to the party claiming the estoppel, they are: (1) Lack of knowledge
and of the means of knowledge of the truth as to the facts in ques-tion; (2) reliance upon
the conduct of the party estopped; and (3) action based thereon of such a character as to
change his position prejudicially.
Tew v. Manwaring, 94 Idaho 50, 53, 480 P.2d 896, 899 (1971). Fatty’s LLC did not make any
false representations to Alsco about the Alsco Contract, and Alsco had full knowledge that Fatty’s
LLC was receiving services without an express written acceptance or renewal of the Alsco
Contract.
At the time of the alleged assumption of debt by Fatty’s LLC (i.e., January 2013), the 60month renewal contract did not yet exist. Alsco failed to present any evidence that the parties
discussed the contract renewal provision after 2013, or that any new consideration was exchanged
in connection with the alleged five-year renewal. Under these circumstances, this Court should
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adopt the persuasive and sensible holdings in the Texas case Farone v. Bag'n Baggage, Ltd., 165
S.W.3d 795 (Tex. App. 2005), wherein the court stated:
The original contract could not be performed within one year. Any implied renewal of the
contract, therefore, could not be performed within one year. The statute of frauds requires
that those agreements are not enforceable unless the promise or agreement…is in writing
and signed by the party to be charged with the promise or agreement or by someone who
is lawfully authorized to sign for him. Here, there may have been implied agreements to
continue the original contract; but, without a further writing during each period of
extension of the original two-year agreement, any subsequent agreements are not
enforceable.
Id., at p. 801. See also Ripani v. Liberty Loan Corp., 95 Cal. App. 3d 603, 609, 157 Cal. Rptr.
272, 276 (1979) (Renewal or extension of a lease in excess of one year is subject to the statute of
frauds and therefore re-quires a writing.).
Moreover, the Supreme Court should adopt the persuasive findings in People ex rel.
Deneen v. Econ. Light & Power Co., 241 Ill. 290, 89 N.E. 760 (1909), which finds that a multiyear contract constitutes a stand-alone contract, independent and severable from any renewals
terms in the contract. Id., at p. 354. The undisputed evidence at trial showed that the original
contract between Alsco and Clay Roman were severable and that Fatty’s did not have a meeting
of the minds with Alsco as to contract renewals.
The appellate record shows that Alsco knew about the change in business from Tons of
Fun, LLC and Fatty’s LLC. Alsco stopped delivering during the interim transition period. The
district court abused its discretion in finding that Alsco was excused from complying with the
statute of frauds under these circumstances.
E.

The District Court Erred in Concluding Alsco Met its Burden for an Award of
Liquidated Damages.
As a general rule, “where the forfeiture or damage fixed by a contract is arbitrary and bears

no reasonable relation to the anticipated damage, is exorbitant or unconscionable, it is regarded as
a ‘penalty, and the contractual provision therefor is void an unenforceable.” Melaleuca, Inc., v.
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Foeller, 155 Idaho 920, 927, 318 P.3d 910, 917 (2014) (quoting Graves v. Cupric, 75 Idaho 451,
456, 272 P.2d 1020, 1023 (1954)).
Alsco did not attempt to introduce any evidence regarding its actual damages. During cross
examination, Alsco admitted that the value of the materials it purchased and used at Fatty’s LLC
bar totaled $2,000.00 and that Alsco had not invested anywhere close to $21,000 in actual product
purchases for Fatty’s Bar LLC. Tr. pp. 119 LL. 8 -12. When asked about lost profits, Alsco did
not have any evidence that it incurred lost profits as a result of the early cancellation of the Alsco
Agreement – only that it lost liquidated damages. Tr. p. 142 LL 1-25. Alsco failed to show that
the liquidated damages of $21,000 bore any reasonable relationship to its actual damages. The
district court therefore erred in awarding Alsco liquidated damages.
F.
The District Court Erred in Awarding Cost and Attorney Fees to Alsco.
The district court erred in awarding attorney fees to Alsco on its successor liability claim.
R. pp. 26-46. The district court awarded Alsco approximately $26,766.00 in fees and $1,513.37
in costs. Id. The district court based its fees award on the provisions of the Tons of Fun/Alsco
Contract, as well as on Idaho Code § 12-120(3). Fatty’s LLC believes that the district court should
not have awarded any damages to Alsco under a successor liability claim, and so Alsco should not
have been entitled to prevailing party fees under contract theory, or under Idaho Code § 12-120(3)
and Rule 54. The Supreme Court should reverse the award of costs and fees to Alsco in its entirety.
Further, the district court apportioned fees between Defendants Roman and Fatty’s LLC
on a disproportionate bases without any support in the record. R. pp. 39-41. Fatty’s LLC raised
the issue of apportionment of fees between defendants in its Motion to Disallow Costs and Fees.
Aug. R. p. 60. Despite this, Alsco’s counsel did not submit any memorandum of fees that would
demonstrate, in any way, how fees were incurred with respect to each defendant. Aug. R. pp. 4855. Without any such testimony or assertions from counsel for Alsco, it was error for the district
court to apportion fees in such a manner.
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G.

The District Court Should Award Fees to Fatty’s LLC on Remand.
As set out above, Fatty’s LLC believes that this Court should vacate the award of damages

to Alsco on its successor liability claim. Alsco was not awarded damages on any other theory or
claim. Thus, on remand, the district court should award Fatty’s LLC its costs and fees as the
prevailing party under Idaho Code § 12-120(3) and Rule 54. The commercial transactions between
the parties forms the basis of Alsco’s claims. The Court can award Fatty’s LLC its fees under
Section § 12-120(3) even if it finds that the alleged renewal contract with Alsco is not enforceable.
See Lawrence v. Jones, 124 Idaho 748, 864 P.2d 194 (Ct. App. 1993). See also Erickson v. Flynn,
138 Idaho 430, 436, 64 P.3d 959, 965 (Ct. App. 2002) (attorney fees unquestionably are to be
awarded under this subsection where the cause of action is for breach of a commercial contract;
where the claim is contractual, fees must be awarded to the prevailing party even though, as here,
liability under the contract was not established). Fatty’s LLC presented arguments for costs and
fees to the district court. The district court erred in ruling in favor of Alsco and in denying Fatty’s’
request for cots and fees. The Supreme Court should remand that issue for further proceedings and
should direct the district court to allow Fatty’s the opportunity to submit a Rule 54 memorandum
of costs and fees on remand.
H.

The Court Should Award Fatty’s Its Costs and Fees on Appeal.
Fatty’s LLC is entitled to costs and fees on appeal. See I.A.R. 35(a)(5) and I.A.R. 40, 41.
Idaho follows what is known as the “American Rule” for attorney fees, which rule holds

that “no fee awards are available absent contractual or statutory authority.” Sopatyk v. Lemhi
County, 151 Idaho 809, 819, 264 P.3d 916, 926 (2011). In this case, Fatty’s LLC is entitled to fees
against Alsco on appeal under Idaho Code § 12-120(3) due to the underlying commercial
transactions between the parties. See Erickson v. Flynn, cited above. The Court can award Fatty’s
LLC its fees even if it finds that the alleged renewal contract with Alsco is not enforceable. Id.
Fatty’s LLC should be entitled to an award of fees under Idaho Code § 12-121 for any
frivolous, unreasonable, or unfounded arguments by Alsco on appeal. See Minich v. Gem State
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